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ABSTRACT
Most organizations have access control policies, and many
have to change them frequently to get work done. Currently,
the way such changes are made often has a significant im-
pact on the organization’s security, productivity, and em-
ployee satisfaction. Those who have to make the decisions
are put on the spot, and depending on their perspective
and circumstances, the decision is biased towards business
or security interests. A decision support system for access
control policies could mitigate these problems, but to be ef-
fective, such a system needs a significant amount of informa-
tion about specific security and business risks and benefits,
and collecting this information requires significant invest-
ment. In this paper, we present a participatory approach
to collecting this information, which not only reduces cost,
but increases effectiveness because it ensures that specific
local knowledge and downstream risks are represented and
visible to decision-makers. We evaluated our systematically
developed decision-support prototype in formative evalua-
tions with employees and decision-makers from a variety of
backgrounds. We found that, among others, decision sup-
port is highly dependent on the organizational context and
that the collected factors need to be contextualized for the
contributing individuals.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection
Keywords
Access control, Security usability, Decision support
1. INTRODUCTION
Effective access control requires that any changes to au-
thorization policy1 are made efficiently and maintain pro-
tection as required. When decisions on policy changes lack
1“Policy” refers in this paper to the technical specification
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transparency or understanding of the resulting risks and
benefits, this can impact an organization’s productivity (an
overly restrictive policy may stop employees from tackling
tasks), security (if policies result in over-entitlements), and
employee satisfaction (because they feel hampered in their
tasks or unfairly barred from access to resources) [18, 23].
Theories on organizational decision-making describe those
decisions as “organized anarchies” through a “garbage can”
model [9]: In dynamic environment, streams of choices, prob-
lems, and solutions can take on the state of garbage that
needs to be processed to take decisions. This can lead to
actions being taken without considering the implications of
policy changes. Employees in front-line business processes,
who are affected by access restrictions, often have no insight
into why a policy has been set that way.
To address the question of how to design adequate mea-
sures for specific access control contexts, and arrive at satis-
factory approaches for functional and administrative staff,
we need to understand and support the decision-making
around policies. In this paper, we address whether and how
we can guide the decision-making, and what information
needs to be collected to offer effective support. Particu-
larly, we examine how decision guidance can be efficiently
implemented as part of policy-change procedures, and de-
scribe how a decision-support tool can be developed to fit a
specific organizational context. We evaluated our decision-
support prototype in formative evaluations with policy mak-
ers (making the decision on policy changes) and functional
staff, and found that decision support is highly context-
dependent: The formality of organization, the difficulty of
decisions, and the mental framing of the involved individuals
determine whether and how participatory decision-support
is feasible and beneficial.
2. THE PROBLEMSWITH DECISIONS
Decision-making has been extensively researched in cog-
nitive psychology, showing several cognitive effects that lead
to decisions that differ from those expected from a careful
weighing of arguments [10]. In information security, these
effects have been, for example, shown for privacy decisions
[1, 2]. The reason for this behavior is the “bounded rational-
ity” of humans when taking decisions: They apply heuristics
that depend on the framing of risk factors, whether the fac-
tors can be easily remembered, and other biases [7]. For
authorization decisions, “satisficing” [14] is particularly rele-
vant; decision-makers choose the first option that seems ade-
of allowed activities of principals. For more general rules of
conduct w.r.t. security, we use the term “security policy.”
quate, instead of examining all available options. According
to West [22], security decisions are difficult because the risks
are often abstract, compared to benefits from taking risks.
Another theory that has been applied to organizational
decision-making about information security is the principal–
agent theory, which states that decisions are impacted by
externalities and information asymmetry [16]. Externalities
are positive or negative effects of the decision on entities
not involved in the decision; for example, an individual may
choose an insecure path that is convenient for them, but puts
the organization at risk. Information asymmetry describes
the different levels of information for staff and managers:
Managers may choose some authorization policies because
they do not know how this will impact employees’ work.
3. IMPROVING DECISIONS
Participation and security awareness.
Participatory processes can motivate staff, particularly in
small groups with high identification [20]. Participation can
potentially increase the acceptance of policy decisions, and
lead to higher satisfaction with, and effectiveness of, autho-
rization. To make good decisions, the individuals involved
need to be aware of the associated risks. Siponen [19] ar-
gues that all staff who interacts with information systems
should be security-aware. A typical approach to awareness-
building is reinforcement (supporting appropriate, and pun-
ishing inappropriate behavior), and social learning (learn-
ing from close contact, imitation, and the understanding of
concepts) [3]. We argue that both can be fostered through
appropriate decision-guidance.
Comprehensible decision factors.
The understanding of security is affected by the way hu-
mans conceive abstract security measures. Humans build
mental models [12] of how security measures work. Gener-
ally, it is sufficient for them to have a simplified task-action
mental model of how a mechanism works – the same way
many people can drive a car, even if they do not under-
stand in detail how it works. Camp [7] and Wash [21] have
identified mental model humans have of security.
Abstract decision-factors are difficult to comprehend; mental-
models theory suggests that understanding can be improved
by presenting a specific example in a context that staff un-
derstand. For medical risk communications, Rothman and
Kiviniemi [17] found that contextualizing risks can increase
awareness and influence behavior – people need to be able to
“simulate” or imagine the consequences of risks [13]. In soci-
ology, Cannell and Otway [8] argue that “any risk communi-
cation must take into account the knowledge and experience
of the audience it addresses.”
For authorization policy decisions, we thus need to develop
adequate and consistent mental models in the communica-
tion of decision factors and increase the concreteness of the
factors by contextualizing them for the individual.
Guiding decisions.
Ahern et al. [2] argue that for privacy decisions in social
networks, decision guidance could help to prevent atypical
settings that may not reflect the individuals’ intention. The
decision-support approach by Beresnevichiene et al. [5] for
security-investment is based on factors such as trustworthi-
ness of users. However, they do not address the problem of
eliciting the necessary information for the risk calculations.
4. DECISION-SUPPORT STUDY
To explore how selected approaches to decision support
help to improve policy decision-making, and what prob-
lems occur in practice, we built a decision-support prototype
based on the risk factors identified by employees of a large
enterprise, and evaluated its practical viability.
4.1 Eliciting decision factors
In the first part of the study, we elicited and structured the
factors which need to be considered in policy decisions. One
researcher (not affiliated with the organization) coded tran-
scripts of interviews on security compliance in a large, multi-
national organization. Semi-structured interviews (lasting
about 45 minutes each) were conducted with 118 partici-
pants in two countries (78 face-to-face, 40 by telephone).
Grounded Theory open coding [6, 11], identified 172 quotes
and 62 raw codes on risk and benefit factors, which partici-
pants considered relevant in a variety of contexts, including
in security-critical and privacy-relevant areas. Axial coding
of these produced five high-level decision factors for risk:
“benefit”, “high-level policy”, “data sensitivity”, “impact”,
and “threat”. For example, the quote:
“. . . but it could do damage to the company, the
company share price and so forth”
was coded as “Impact: Organizational: Share value”. We
then built the decision-support prototype by creating six
spreadsheets as decision artifacts, assigning factor group and
formulating questions for each factor.
4.2 Evaluation of a decision-support tool
In the second part of the study, we conducted a formative
evaluation of the decision-support prototype with three staff
and three policy makers from a variety of practical back-
grounds. The evaluation questions were:
• In what context this type of decision-support tool ef-
fective?
• What decision factors can be collected how and from
whom (comprehensibility, precision of data, willing-
ness to give)?
Participants were selected to represent several types of or-
ganization (size, Mintzberg’s Structural Configuration [15])
and position, as shown in Table 1. Using participants from
a different context than the interviews in Study 1 allows us
to assess the general applicability of the prototype. Whilst
the evaluation sessions did not present representative and
comprehensive coverage of decision-support problems, they
provided us with rich subjective data to inform further re-
search.
The evaluations lasted about one hour each and were semi-
structured: They first covered preliminary questions on the
participant’s background and relation to authorization in
practice. Then, the interviewer went with the participant
through a participant-specific scenario, asking the partic-
ipant to complete the questionnaires. While making the
evaluations difficult to compare, the individual scenarios al-
lowed us to reduce the effect of participants having to un-
derstand the possibly remote scenario [21]. The participants
Role Position Organization
M1 Manager Program man-
ager of dev.
team of 26
Software industry, multi-
national, 1000 emp., Divi-
sionalized simple structure
M2 Manager Project leader
of 6
Web agency, 15 emp., sim-
ple structure
M3 Manager Unit manager
of 25
Dev. company of large
bank, 300 emp., profes-
sional bureaucracy
S1 Staff Food quality
assurance
Food industry, multi-
national, 2500 emp.,
divisionalized professional
bureaucracy
S2 Staff Customer rela-
tions
Regional utilities company,
2500 emp., divisionalized
machine bureaucracy
S3 Staff Technical
quality assur-
ance
Security-sensitive electron-
ics, 1500 emp., professional
bureaucracy
Table 1: Study participant sampling
were asked to think out aloud while completing the forms
and the walk-through were enriched with in-situ prompts.
Following the walk-through, additional posterior questions
were asked on the perception of the adequacy and usefulness
for the participant’s organizational context.
The evaluations were audio-recorded and transcribed. The
transcripts were coded for the comments on and problems
with the decision factors, and statements on the usefulness
of decision support. The open coding resulted in 114 raw
codes that were further consolidated as shown in the find-
ings below.
5. DECISION-SUPPORT PROTOTYPE
The aim of the decision-support prototype is to separate
different categories of risk factors, so that each group can be
elicited individually when appropriate as part of the change
procedure. The prototype consists of interrelated spread-
sheets (artifacts) to collect the risk and benefit factors, and
present aggregations of the factors to guide decisions.
5.1 Prototype design
The artifacts encompass questions to elicit the decision
factors and aggregations of the factors. The questions aim
for qualitative input, requiring either ratings (1–5 for a given
scale, e.g. expected benefit), binary yes/no answers (e.g.
having a specific awareness), or textual inputs (type of ac-
tivity, informal benefit). Each question and output is ac-
companied by contextualizing clues, such as examples from
the factor-elicitation study. The six artifacts of the tool are
listed in Table 2.
While the decision-support tool does not prescribe a spe-
cific policy-change process, we assume an example procedure
for didactic reasons: (1) A “requester” completes a request
form for a concrete activity in a system on a specific set of
data and chooses an adequate usage profile for the request;
(2) the manager of the requester signs off the request, ver-
ifying the necessity of the request; (3) the “owner” of the
resource decides on whether to enact the requested changes
and how.
5.1.1 Change request
The change-request artifact is primarily thought to be
completed by staff who require extended permissions, or on
behalf of them. The artifact poses questions on 1) the gen-
eral task, 2) the specific activity and data, 3) the benefit of
providing the permission, and 4) a self-assessment of security
awareness. While the participants were generally comfort-
able answering the questions, we still noted interesting dif-
ficulties: For example, there were contradicting statements
how concrete the questions on the benefit need to be posed.
A rather abstract question (“How high would you rate the
benefit for the organization granting this permission?”) can
be difficult because it did not guide the individual on what
to enter:
S1: “This is difficult to say [as one factor] since
[activity] only makes out a small part of my work,
but I need that transaction a lot if I do [activity]”
Conversely, a more concrete form demonstrated the problem
of specific benefits not fitting the given schema of frequency
and time savings:
S3: “Productivity improvement would be from 0
to 100, because else I could not do it. . . there are
also cases. . . [in which] having access improves
the quality of work”
Another benefit factor that the prototype asked for were
indirect risks, i.e. risks that result from not granting the per-
mission and staff needing to take more dangerous approaches
to addressing the business needs (e.g. sharing passwords).
This factor was problematic for the participants who were
unfamiliar with this notion (S2: “We don’t share passwords
among each other”).
5.1.2 Usage environment
The artifact on the usage environment should elicit risk
factors that concern the context in which the permission –
if granted – would be used, such as the physical security of
the environment, the satisfaction of staff, and stress in the
specific environment. Participants agreed that a distinction
between the contexts is useful as it is common practice to
take it into account for decisions, for example, distinguishing
between desktop and laptop computers (e.g. S3 and M3).
Problems were seen in the added value of specific factors.
For example, multiple participant raised doubts on whether
the satisfaction has a significant impact on the threat of
malicious activity (without referencing the participant):
“Well, the overall satisfaction in the company is
not really high, but as I hear it people are all
very loyal and rather shocked if someone takes
information to another company”
A more practical problem with the collection of the data
was that staff stated that they would not answer honestly,
fearing that the data could be misused:
“I could answer the employee satisfaction. . . but I
would not answer questions on satisfaction, un-
less it is anonymous”
Instead, it was suggested to reuse available data, for exam-
ple, from employee surveys.
It was also interesting to observe how the physical-security
factor was misunderstood or unclear depending on the fram-
ing of the participant. In case of organizations with a high
emphasis on physical safety (e.g. utilities in case of S2), phys-
ical security is understood as the safety of the workplace (S2:
“Is this about tripping hazards?”).
Artifact Example role Activity Information Source
Change
request
Requester Permission re-
quest
Benefit from change, regulatory/qualification aspects,
personal awareness of risks
Manual input
Usage envi-
ronment
Requester Permission re-
quest
Risks from the environment in which the requester
uses the permission (e.g. “office”, “on the road”)
Manual input, reusable
Change
approval
Requester
manager
Approve
request
Summary of the benefits and risks of the request Aggregation of request and
usage environment
Permission
profile
Resource
owner
Verify request Risks associated with granting the permission to en-
act a specific activity in a system on a set of data
Manual input, reusable
Role profile Resource
owner
Verify request Aggregate of the information on role members and
risks from permissions assigned to the role
Aggregation of existing data
from previous requests
Change deci-
sion
Resource
owner
Verify request Summary of the benefits and risks from permission–
role and user–role assignments
Aggregation of data from
prior artifacts
Table 2: Artifacts produced and used in the decision-support tool as part of the change procedure
5.1.3 Permission profile
The permission profile defines the risks associated with
misusing a specific permission, such as “read source code
from project X”. The factors of this artifact cover the gen-
eral sensitivity of the data (e.g. personal data, commercial
sensitivity), impact of misuse (e.g. from commercial or le-
gal consequences), and the threat (the probability e.g. of a
misuse or of accidental incidents). For higher precision of
the risk estimation, we would need to elicit the impact and
threat values for individual scenarios, and aggregate the risk
scores. However, to reduce the burden of completing the
form, we decided to approximate the overall risk from sepa-
rate elicitations.
Whether staff participants were able to complete the form
depended on the individual context. For instance, for the
legal impact:
S3: “The data are also sometimes part of the
contract. . . [the technical project manager] knows
better about that than me”
In other cases, the variation of the impact is high:
S1: “It depends the kind of information. . . it might
be already rounded. . . or aggregated. . . in other cases
you don’t want to hand out [at all]”
Generally, there were doubts about the scalability of this
kind of data collection:
M1: “What would be in the case that you had
20 different projects. . . Then, one would want to
have a hierarchy, an ‘override’ for specific projects.”
5.1.4 Role profile
The role profile is generated from aggregations of data on
assigned permissions and contexts of assigned users. First,
this artifact can inform decisions on whether it is appro-
priate to assign a role to a user, that is, whether the risks
from the role are adequate for the benefit and the context
of the request. Second, the artifact can support the decision
of whether the users already assigned to a role make it ad-
equate to assign an additional permission to the role. M1
remarked potential problems of scalability from the broad
spread of roles.
5.1.5 Change approval and decision
Aggregating risks and benefits can support both approval
(by the line manager of requester), and a policy-makers final
decision. For approval by a manager of the requester, the
approval artifact aggregates information on the benefits and
context risks. For the actual decision, the policy-maker may
derive insights on the adequacy of different change options
from the risks and benefits. The decision artifact, in addition
to the approval data, aggregates the information on the risks
from the requested permission, from the users assigned to
a role, and from permissions assigned to a role (see role
profile). Problems stated by participants with respect to the
aggregations of values primarily related to the transparency
of the source of the aggregations (M2: “I don’t understand
where those numbers come from.”).
5.2 Change procedures with decision support
Different organizations have different procedures for mak-
ing policy changes, ranging from informal direct communi-
cation to highly regulated form-based procedures [4]. The
decision-support prototype does not prescribe a specific pro-
cess model. Of the studied authorization contexts, five had
an informal and one had a formal procedure.
Although the forms of the decision-support prototype in-
troduce extra effort to informal procedures, the participants
did not categorically reject employing such a system and see
advantages even for small organizations:
M2: “The current size of our company would not
justify this tool, but in larger companies where
you cannot have the overview over all areas and
the applications. . . In our case, it would be nice
to structure the decisions”
S3, for example, further remarked with respect to the change-
request artifact:
“Actually, I already provide this kind of informa-
tion – only, I. . . formulate it as an email”
In addition to the actual procedure, participants also re-
ported that discussions take place around the requests to
assign a permissions, and the tool needs to support these:
S1: “We discuss with [other department] how I
can access that transaction. . . then my manager
requests the permission from IT”
5.3 Security awareness
We asked our participants about risks they are aware of, in
connection with granting permissions. The participants pri-
marily identified unintentional risks, such as “stolen laptop”
(M1), or intentional risks, such as “data manipulation” (M2,
S2, S3), but never gave a comprehensive range of threats.
The awareness of risks depended on the framing from the
work practice, e.g. for the indirect risks in the change-request
artifact, or the physical security for the usage-environment
artifact.
M1: “On our level, we only look at the benefit and
ignore the risk. . . that’s why this could be helpful”
6. DECISION-SUPPORT PROBLEMS
During the evaluation of the decision-support prototype,
participants had problems in connection with the collection
of information (all apart from transparency), and with the
interpretation of aggregated data (only comprehensibility
and transparency):
Availability of precise knowledge.
Depending on the perspective of the individual complet-
ing the form, some information may be difficult to elicit.
One reason was that the data was not available to the spe-
cific role (see permission profile). In other cases, the par-
ticipants did not have a comparison (e.g. for satisfaction in
the usage-environment artifact). Finally, the accuracy of the
data collection is also affected from the status-quo bias [10]:
Individuals rely overly on the current situation for their es-
timation of risks (S1: “So many have the permission, I don’t
see it as critical”).
Acceptability of information request.
Problems also occurred when the request for the data is
seen as sensitive. Apart from the usage-environment factor
of satisfaction (see artifact), this could be observed for the
stress level in the team due to a general mistrust of how
stress levels would be interpreted by superiors.
Adequate degree of abstraction.
Despite the goal of the prototype to achieve a high level
of concreteness, we observed both problems due to abstract
and concrete factors. Too abstract factors primarily affected
overly broad questions (e.g. the benefit rating for the change
request). Conversely, the questions could also be too con-
crete when they excluded a specific kind of input that does
not fit the given questions (see request artifact).
Comprehensibility of the question and the factor.
Participants found questions difficult to understand if they
were not familiar with the context – e.g. physical security.
One reason can be that the factor is not applicable to the
specific environment, as seen for the indirect risks when pass-
word sharing did not occur. Moreover, the factor behind the
question can be conceptually difficult: For instance, partic-
ipants had problems to distinguish impact and threat for
the permission profile – two concepts that are difficult to
separate for non-security experts.
Transparency of aggregations.
For aggregations of factors, participants had problems with
the transparency of the information presented. For exam-
ple, for the change-approval artifact, M2 was missing the
indication of where the data came from (see artifact). M1
similarly requested for the role profile to receive richer in-
formation on its members (see artifact).
7. DISCUSSION
With respect to the applicability of decision support, our
participants questioned whether a risk- and benefit-based
decision is generally realistic:
M3: “If someone should develop. . . and needs a
permission for that, we cannot say ‘not possible’ ”
Further, participants argued that a certain level of trust is
necessary in a work relationship.
Regarding the usefulness decision support, participants
stated a number of positive effects from such a system: First,
it improves the awareness: Participants found the prototype
to increase their security awareness (cf. Section 5.3). Second,
it improves request communication:
S2: “It would reduce misunderstandings if I could
formulate through such a form what permissions
I require and for what reason”
Third, it improves decision transparency:
M1: “What would be important, is a certain trans-
parency in the decision. . . currently it’s rather just
‘no’. . . if some details were known, it would be
more understandable”
Validity of the results.
The study elicited subjective data from participants com-
ing from different contexts. Consequently, we cannot expect
to achieve a precise and comprehensive picture of the indi-
vidual contexts. Because of the broad range of contexts that
exist in practice, a formative evaluation with a limited num-
ber of participants cannot determine whether it will work
for all circumstances. But the feedback obtained indicates
that it has the potential to work for a range of organizational
contexts.
Recommendations for decision-factor collection.
• Adequately embed collection in procedures: Despite the
problems found in the study, the results indicate that
participation through distributed data-collection is pos-
sible. However, considering the required formality and
centralization, a decision-support system must be ad-
equately integrated for the specific environment (cf.
Section 5.2).
• Contextualize factors: Several of the problems were
due to the difficulty in understanding the factors. Of-
ten a re-framing of the question in a more familiar way
helped. Questionnaires for collecting information thus
need to be domain-specific and tailorable to provide
appropriate clues to those completing the form.
• Respect the sensitivity of factors: We need to respect
that certain factors, such as employee satisfaction, are
sensitive and employees may be reluctant to answer
the respective questions honestly. The sensitivity of
factors needs to be elicited, and indirect sources and
the necessity need to be considered.
• Offer flexibility in data collection: For efficiency, the
forms must be flexible to cater varying security needs,
for example, requiring a baseline evaluation of risks in
uncritical cases, but more details for critical ones (cf.
Section 5.1.3).
• Reuse existing data: Every question in a form will re-
quire cognitive effort. As shown earlier, we can reuse
data between requests to reduce the number of ques-
tions. In addition, we could leverage information al-
ready available elsewhere (e.g. employee surveys) to
support and validate user input.
• Support discussions: Decisions often involve negotia-
tions between stakeholders (cf. Section 5.2), who dis-
cuss the needs, risks, and technical alternatives as part
of the process. Decision guidance should support this.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a step towards providing decision
support for authorization: We built a prototype decision-
support tool and conducted a formative evaluation to assess
the viability and usefulness of this type of tool. Our eval-
uation sessions explored how well the benefit and risk fac-
tors can be collected in a participatory form for efficiency.
The responses we got show that effective decision-support
is highly context-dependent: For instance, whether decision
support is needed depends on how difficult the decisions on
granting permissions are, and how distant policy makers are
from the staff requesting permission changes. To be effi-
cient, the decision-support system needs to be embedded
in the organization-specific procedures, and support nego-
tiations between stakeholders if necessary. Moreover, the
study showed that the factors need to be understandable
– and that means e.g. contextualized. The forms need to
be adapted to the security needs of the organization and
individual requests, and reuse existing data – from earlier
requests and from external sources.
To develop the tool further, we will need to conduct de-
tailed case studies, adapting the tool over time in a range
of organizational contexts. Continuing the work on security
awareness in this paper, we may further examine the connec-
tion between participation in decisions and gains in security
awareness. This particularly involves whether completing
forms with decision factors results in a better understand-
ing of the consequences of circumventing security measures,
e.g. sharing passwords.
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